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THE KEY TO VALUE: THE DEBATE
OVER COMMENSURABILITY IN
NEOCLASSICAL AND CREDIT
APPROACHES TO MONEY
CHRISTINE DESAN*
I
INTRODUCTION
As a discipline, economics has famously eschewed debates over the definition
of money. Economist André Orléan, summing up the approach, describes money
as a “peripheral fact, a secondary device, a mere adjunct” to the concept of
“utility” at the center of the neoclassical theory of value.1 That position is rooted
in epistemological principle. Most economists prize the market’s capacity to
reveal the values prioritized by individuals. In its ideal operation, the net sorting
of private choices produces a distribution of goods and services that maximizes
human well-being. By inviting individuals to express and order their preferences,
the market thus conceived holds the potential to reconcile individual selfdetermination with aggregate social welfare. That neoclassical epistemology
engenders a particular approach to money: as a measure of comparison, money
emanates from the process of expressing preferences. Money is, in other words,
an artifact of choice in the model—thus the “peripheral fact” that Orléan
describes.
The neoclassical model is supposed to capture essential elements of the
economy, if not its detail in actual experience. The basic character of economic
activity implied in the model is barter: agents compare the goods they have
against those they want in order to trade as warranted to increase their own
satisfaction. The focus is on the exchange of “real” objects—the goods and
services understood to be at the heart of material productivity. In many accounts,
the activity of comparison produces money unproblematically: once we assume
ratios of value, commensurability—comparability of goods in a common unit—
appears. After all, if the value that market activity concerns can be theorized to
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precede that market, it should be articulable in some measure.2 According to
classical commentators, some item emerges from the set of valued items and acts
to measure its counterparts.3 In more modern renditions, money can be a unit
without intrinsic value, a measuring convention like the inch or the pound.4 Like
an inch or a pound, the monetary unit is simply a quantum of pre-existing value.
And as a vehicle for comparison, the medium does not affect the activity of
choosing (although political communities can interfere with economic activity by
disturbing money’s operation).
A problem perennial in the neoclassical model is that money in the real world
does not take the form assigned it in the model. Rather than a commodity or a
convention, money appears again and again in historical experience to be a credit
medium. Moreover, rather than emanating from the plethora of individuated
comparisons that people undertake in order to barter, moneys appear to emerge
when states or political communities design them to coordinate and mobilize for
war and other public initiatives. Thus most, perhaps all, major modern moneys
are sovereign liabilities—IOUs of the governments that issue them.5 The
commercial bank deposits that multiply the money supply are, likewise, a credit
medium. Privately extended, they hold value only in reference to the public base
money they promise; they are privileged for use and supported by the national
banks that modulate that sovereign unit of account. In that sense, commercial
banks are akin to franchisees of the government.6 Privately issued bank money
therefore fits within the monetary project of governing sovereigns, as a kind of
public credit money by delegation.
This Article sketches an alternative approach to commensurability and value
that is consistent with the modern moneys we observe. The argument begins by
taking the neoclassical approach to money seriously. Against that baseline, it
becomes clear that conceptualizing money as credit has implications that are
arrestingly different. It means that we must look to the character of money as
credit because that character affects the exchange made with it. If that is right, we
need to reconsider value and its relationship to the market and the decisions

2. For a highly developed argument that mainstream economics presupposes a substantive theory
of value, see id. at 9–84.
3. See, e.g., 3 DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE, pt. II, § II (1739–40); John Locke,
Two Treatises of Government, in 2 THE WORKS OF JOHN LOCKE, ch. V, §§ 46–47, 50 (London, Rivington,
12th ed. 1824); John Locke, Further Considerations Concerning Raising the Value of Money, in 1 LOCKE
ON MONEY 410 (Patrick Hyde Kelly ed., 1991) [hereinafter Further Considerations].
4. See, e.g., James Tobin, Money, in MONETARY ECONOMICS 224–25 (Steven N. Durlauf &
Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008).
5. For the statutory definition of the dollar along those lines, see, for example, 12 U.S.C. § 411
(2018) and 31 U.S.C. § 5103 (2018). Here, I assume the character of modern money as credit. Considering
that character, the evidence supporting it, and changes in the design of money as credit has been the
subject of much of my earlier work. See, e.g., CHRISTINE DESAN, MAKING MONEY: COIN, CURRENCY,
AND THE COMING OF CAPITALISM (2014); Christine Desan, Money as a Legal Institution, in MONEY IN
THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 18 (Wolfgang Ernst & David Fox eds., 2014).
6. Robert C. Hockett & Saule T. Omarova, The Finance Franchise, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1143,
1147 (2017).
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made there. The market is not a forum for the expression of pre-existing
preferences. Rather, the process by which communities make money and put it
into circulation as credit shapes the way economic decisions occur. We will have
to rethink that process, its relationship to choice, and the challenges to equality
that come with market exchange in a medium made out of credit.
Part II of this Article explores the paradox sketched above—the striking
incongruity between the conceptualization of money in neoclassical thought and
its recurring character in political communities. I argue that the neoclassical
model of the economy presumes a particular approach to value and money. That
approach enables, indeed encourages, adherents to believe in the basic autonomy
of the market, at least as an ideal. And that ideal has great normative power: it
casts the market as presumptively democratic, in fact more democratic than
representative politics, because only in the economic arena are individual
choices, independently made, directly and equally effective in creating an
equilibrium.
That vision, however appealing, turns on an axiomatic approach to money
that is not conceptually sound. In particular, we cannot assume that the act of
comparison, carried out across different objects by many independent actors,
creates commensurability at the level of value’s expression over the relevant
universe of entities compared. On second look, the Walrasian model at the heart
of general equilibrium theory claims no such thing.7 In that model, the unit of
account precedes rather than follows the act of comparison. Partial equilibrium
models likewise assume a working medium. In other words, neoclassical thought
itself ascribes a unit that will make value commensurable. The unit is abstract and
therefore neutral; it is a device that transparently expresses value without more.
That move is essential to every activity that follows: it enables comparison,
choice, and, eventually, exchange. It thus makes possible market activity as a
process that aggregates individualized preferences and produces prices.
Having assumed a unit that makes values commensurable, neoclassical
thinkers can relegate all other questions about what actual money is and what
role it plays to the realm of applied science.8 That deferral is terrifically enabling.
It allows economists to explain actually observed moneys that don’t conform to
the abstraction in ways consistent with normative premises of equilibrium
models. Thus neoclassical thinkers define money in the real world in ways that
tack close to their presumptions about how money should look: they assume that
exchange activity among equally situated individuals suffices to produce a
medium as bartering individuals converge on a commodity or agree to an empty
measure as a convention. Although those moneys fail to resemble the unit of

7. For a concise overview of the model, introduced by Léon Walras in the late nineteenth century,
see ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 13–14, 39–50.
8. Cf. Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the U.S. Fed. Reserve Sys., Implications
of the Financial Crisis for Economics, Speech Presented at the Conference Co-Sponsored by the Center
for Economic Policy Studies and the Bendheim Center for Finance 2–5 (Sept. 24, 2010) (distinguishing
an economic “science” of fundamentals from economic “engineering” in the applied sense).
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account imputed by Walras—they are either material and non-neutral or nonmaterial and meaningless—those problems are not categorized as fatal.9 To the
contrary, economists can correct for monetary dynamics while identifying those
dynamics as distortions, given money’s deviation in the real world from the
Walrasian abstraction.
In effect, neoclassical economics imputes a term to resolve the challenge of
commensurability at the conceptual level: it assumes money as an abstract and
neutral unit of account. The discipline subsequently explains moneys actually
observed: it focuses here on money as a medium emerging from trade. The sleight
of hand submerges the issue of incommensurable values. Incongruities are set
aside as the byproduct of difficulties on the ground.
Part III of this Article treats the Walrasian recognition that commensuration
precedes choice as an invitation. It begins by recognizing that, just as the
sequence in the model suggests, participants in a market, conceptual or real,
establish a unit of account before beginning the process of comparing otherwise
incommensurable values.10 That money is created by something other than their
decentralized choice, activity that can take place only when the auction occurs.
In fact, we know that modern societies regularly create money out of public credit
that is packaged to have material worth and to circulate. Those societies install
value in a unit by identifying that unit with an obligation owed to the group,
giving the unit out as payment when resources are needed in advance by the
group, and accepting it back in satisfaction of the obligation.11
Once participants have a unit that substantiates value cognizable to all or
virtually all participants, they can use it in exchange. Emerging from a world
heterogeneous in so many aspects, participants now have a unit with a common
reference point and meaningful worth over time. They offer and take it for
objects and services. Their practice of exchange produces prices.
Commensurability in the new money emerges from that activity. Value, as it is
articulated in this money, is not pre-existing but rather produced.
The parameters of this observation are both specific and capacious. On the
one hand, the argument reaches value as it occurs in the monetary realm, not
beyond it. Many communities have ordered relations without money and many
aspects of our experience, even in the modern world, elude or repel expression
in that medium. Human desire, appetite, and need make us prize certain things,
people, or qualities independent of their being articulated in money.
On the other hand, the monetary realm is vast. It represents all exchange that
occurs because and insofar as money as a medium makes items comparable. That
commensurability alone allows the kind of ranking, a comparative relation, that

9. Walras’s model assumed a monetary unit that was material (one among commodity goods) and
could measure other goods without affecting their value. For discussion, see MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC
THEORY IN RETROSPECT 144 (5th ed. 1996).
10. Thanks to Jeremy Stein for discussion that clarified the importance of the sequence.
11. In the interim, societies support money’s use as a medium, thus constructing an instrument that
circulates. I leave that defining feature of money aside here.
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persuades observers to understand the market as a coherent terrain of decisionmaking. Thus economists understand “price,” for all its inconsistencies, to
express a set of real choices, the aggregate work of comparative ordering. In turn,
they hold out the hope that maximizing individual preferences, identified through
price, can move us towards increased social welfare. None of those assumptions
can stand without the shared term that makes comparison possible across an
ocean of goods. The construction of that term is therefore critical to the market
as we know it.12
That conclusion directs attention to the nature of money. In a very
preliminary way, this Article sketches the implications that follow if, as it appears
in the modern world, money is in fact a medium of credit. Most striking is a
feature of money that appears to be structural to that character. The agents that
coordinate the production of credit money—governments and commercial banks
in our system—create that measure and medium in order to spend or loan it to
specific parties. By contrast, they have no reason to issue money evenly across a
population. If so, then money, by definition, enters circulation selectively, spent
or loaned to certain hands. That feature means that markets, at least markets
made in money, are based on a measuring resource—money—that is allocated
unevenly across participants.
This is true at a formal level. Commensurability, according to this view, is a
matter produced when a group restructures its internal relationships, creating a
unit of value that can act as a comparative and injecting that unit into
circulation.13 The nature of credit as the medium matters in that process. Credit
works by advancing a unit of monetary value to some people relative to others.
In that case, as a condition inherent to its construction, money carries value
differentially to participants, those who are graced with credit and those who are
not.
If so, we cannot assume that everyone comparing value has access to the
comparative, if only as a unit of account, that will express his or her preferences.
Money as a credit medium operates by creating capacity as a relative resource.
The process of money’s dissemination articulates value in that unit. In turn,
representations of value manifested as prices are produced in the activity of deals
made for the monetary unit. The results embed both the facility and disparity
represented in the medium. Models that assume money as a neutral measure,
hypothetically accessible as a valuing tool if not a factor endowment, do not give
us information that can be understood as a reflection of people’s preferences.
Rather, we need to reconceptualize value if money is in fact a public credit
medium.

12. I am grateful to Roy Kreitner for his insightful commentary on this point.
13. We will see that the activity of comparing incommensurables cannot produce its own measure.
Nor does an abstract term, given its inability to refer to any substantiated value, supply any coherent
relation to it.
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II
THE NEOCLASSICAL APPROACH
Most neoclassical thinkers believe that “the choices of the agent reflect her/his
preferences, and . . . the preferences of the agent (even when s/he is not selfish),
in turn, reflect the welfare of the agent.”14 In this formulation, value precedes
commercial exchange; it is the “hidden property that is logically prior to such
transactions and that gives them form.”15 Orléan agrees that the commitment to
pre-existing value is central to mainstream economics. In his view, that principle
organizes economic thought. As he observes, “exchange exists because there is
value—value being understood as the distinctive quality of tradable
commodities.”16 That is true whether scholars attribute value to labor or to the
utility of scarce resources, and whether they attempt to model the expression of
choice in general equilibrium theory or in more dynamic partial equilibrium
processes that sort market results by competitive selection and exclusion.17 All
are attempts to understand how recognizing underlying value, in ways that may
be unknown to market actors themselves, “orders the apparent anarchy of
market exchange.”18
According to this approach, the economic process is resolutely comparative;
it assumes a way of measuring the value of real things or their characteristics
against each other.19 Ideally, the exercise itself produces a measure. In
Schumpeter’s words, it is “the exchange ratios between the commodities that are
the really important thing ‘behind’ money prices,”20 or, according to those in the
Marshallian tradition, “the ratio of the marginal utility of the two goods
exchanged.”21 The basic point is that some commensurability in value allows
comparison among the wide heterogeneity of commodifiable items. Neoclassical
theory has split again and again in its debates over value, from the subjectivism
of Bentham’s utility to the methods for comparing pairs of preferences.22 Implicit
across those debates, however, is an agreement that comparison is possible, even
if in an abstract term.
14. YAHYA M. MADRA, LATE NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS: THE RESTORATION OF
THEORETICAL HUMANISM IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC THEORY 15 (2017) (emphasis in original).
15. ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 13.
16. Id.
17. See id. at 9–12 (reviewing the shift from labor to utility theories of value); see also MADRA,
supra note 14, at 13, 48–60 (considering the use of auction and evolutionary arguments in neoclassical
theories of value).
18. ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 13. For that aspiration as a historically developed ideology, see
generally JONATHAN SHEEHAN & DROR WAHRMAN, INVISIBLE HANDS: SELF-ORGANIZATION AND
THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (2015).
19. Commentators often loosely identify preferences for commodities per se, while others specify
the utility of their underlying properties or characteristics. See ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 42–43
(discussing Kelvin Lancaster’s work, which defined utility as an objective quality).
20. JOSEPH ALOIS SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 277 (Elizabeth Boody
Schumpeter ed., 1954).
21. MADRA, supra note 14, at 13.
22. Id. at 4–6, 13, 48–60.
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In fact, abstraction may be essential for most theorists. The market is a
conceptual device, a phenomenon that registers and reflects preferences.
Exchange in turn represents the fact that those preferences, once identified, can
be reordered. The Walrasian auction is only the most elegant representation of
that process. In that model, the critical moment occurs when participants
recognize value and rank it. By contrast, exchange is simply the execution of
those decisions. Thus, “exchangeability is considered to be directly implied,” after
the act of judgment in which individuals make their choices.23 Actual exchange
and the terms on which it occurs is a different subject, one that raises issues of
application, rather than questions of the first order.24 The truck-and-bartering
individuals that Adam Smith made famous are merely carrying out the
commands, we learn, of their inner ideal decision-makers.25
The normative stakes of the neoclassical vision are profound. Within that
frame, the autonomy of individuals—the fact that they make value choices
independent of any influence or mediation—ensures freedom from coercion.
Those actors find sovereignty and equal voice insofar as their preferences operate
to determine the relative value of goods and services. In order to respect the
choices made by individuals, we should preserve that underlying distribution so
far as we can. Their decentralized action is the most democratic of expressions.
In fact, economists claim a connection between the market and the
democratic form explicitly. Milton Friedman legitimates the economic space as,
itself, democratic: “The great advantage of the market . . . is that it permits wide
diversity. It is, in political terms, a system of proportional representation. Each
man can vote, as it were, for the color of tie he wants.”26 Kenneth Arrow
generalizes the logic, suggesting an isomorphism between the economy and
politics in “a capitalist democracy”:
[T]here are essentially two methods by which social choices can be made: voting,
typically used to make ‘political’ decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used
to make ‘economic’ decisions. . . .
. . . The methods of voting and the market . . . are methods of amalgamating the tastes
of many individuals in the making of social choices.27

The exercise of preferences in the market can be tuned in a populist key.
Friedrich Hayek recast the ideal of expressing choice into a method of gathering
23. ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 17.
24. Those working out early partial equilibrium models took a similar approach. Thus Alfred
Marshall would assume a medium and give it unchanging marginal utility for his model, while only
subsequently accommodating the impact of money flows in the real world by way of a money demand
function. See HENRY WILLIAM SPIEGEL, THE GROWTH OF ECONOMIC THOUGHT 567, 583–84 (3d ed.
1991).
25. In fact, we might understand neoclassical responses to “income” approaches, like that of Ralph
Hawtrey, and to Keynesian theory in particular as categorizing the challenges raised there as problems
of application, therefore short-term issues of transition, rather than challenges to the fundamental
structure of assumptions underlying classical and neoclassical thought. See generally RALPH HAWTREY,
CURRENCY AND CREDIT (1919).
26. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 15 (1962).
27. KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 1–2 (3d ed. 2012).
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information, thus elevating the diffuse wisdom of entrepreneurs over the claimed
expertise of centralized planners.28
This conception of the market and its normative stakes explains the
neoclassical approach to money and practitioners’ intransigence on the matter.
Preserving the integrity of the comparative exercise and all that it promises
invites, or perhaps requires, abstracting the definition of money, that is,
blackboxing the unit of account. At the same time, the discipline in applied fields
can accommodate the practical reality that a medium of exchange will exist to
facilitate the actual exercise of reordering goods. The combination will guard the
neutrality in principle of the unit in which value is expressed, while
acknowledging slippage in the real world.
Perhaps the most common method of blackboxing the unit of account is to
assume that one among the commodities traded in a market can act as the
measure of other commodities in that market. In that case, the commodity, which
Walras called a “numeraire” when used as a comparative unit, can be set equal
to one—it expresses its own value after all—and then deployed to measure other
goods. In neoclassical models, the numeraire is a measuring fiction; no one holds
it as a store of value, an intervention that would upset the project of measuring
all commodities against all others in terms of their utility for consumption or
productivity.29 James Tobin takes pains to distinguish the numeraire as a
mathematical supposition from the money actually used to set prices.30 But that
is precisely the point for our purposes: in their effort to hypothesize a measure,
economists split money into its constituent functions. They theorize its identity
as a measure separately from money as a transactional medium, store of value,
or mode of payment. As Mark Blaug writes about the numeraire, “this kind of
money serves only as an abstract unit of account; it may exist in a physical sense
but it need not and trade has all the characteristics of barter.”31
That conclusion is empowering. Having assumed commensurability, the
market for real things can exist independently of a medium. As Blaug describes
the circumstances in which the numeraire operates, “the medium of exchange
being an arbitrary commodity like any other—the total value of all goods
demanded is always identically equal to the total value of all goods supplied.”32
We can then hypothesize the trade of commodities directly for one another by
value; consumer demand thus informs the decisions of producers. As Frank Hahn
summarizes this logic and its consequence, “the best developed model of the
economy cannot find room for [money]” at all, given the zero sum logic.33

28. F. A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519, 520–21 (1945).
29. See BLAUG, supra note 9, at 144; Tobin, supra note 4, at 224, 231.
30. Tobin, supra note 4, at 232; see also MADRA, supra note 14, at 13 (analogizing abstract nature
of utility ratios).
31. BLAUG, supra note 9, at 144.
32. Id.
33. FRANK HAHN, MONEY AND INFLATION 1 (1982).
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Partial equilibrium models, by a somewhat different route, likewise assume
commensurability. Focusing more narrowly on one segment of a market, they
incorporate competition over time into their analyses of market equilibrium.
Whereas general equilibrium models assume adjustments in price offered to all
simultaneously, partial equilibrium models often aim at a process of quantity
adjustment by competitors in a particular industry over a certain period. There,
given demand and the costs of production, “those who cannot survive [at] the
equilibrium price leave the market.”34 Price and budget constraints, put in money
terms, are key assumptions. And, if not an abstract numeraire, money remains an
entity that acts without a clear identity. Writing in the New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics, Tobin pondered how something could hold value as a medium
given that, “[a]ccording to standard theory, something can have positive value
only if it generates positive marginal utility in individuals’ consumption or
positive marginal utility productivity in the making of goods and services.”35
Although he found no clear answer to the puzzle of how money could be so
categorized, efforts to crack the puzzle continued. In the meantime, as Tobin put
it, “what is universal and important is that something is chosen [as money], not
what is chosen.”36
The intuition of real exchange is thus entrenched around an imputed unit of
account. It remains only to make sense of money’s existence and role in the real
world. There, the same intuition shows the way: once we have resolved the
problem of commensurability, comparison is possible but for smaller challenges,
mere frictions in a system that is conceptually operational. Those challenges can
be resolved by decentralized activity—barter that produces a medium, or a
convention that produces an agreed upon measure—that is consistent with the
normative vision of the market as an individuated matter.
As economist after economist emphasizes, real exchange—barter—in the real
world is an unwieldy affair, haunted by difficulties and delays as participants
struggle to overcome obstacles of distance, information, and time, as well as
differences in quantity and in quality that set apart what they have to exchange
from what they want to gain that way.37 Those problems—all failures of a “double
coincidence of wants”—generate the need for money: economists almost
34. Yahya M. Madra, Auction or Selection? Two Competing (Neoclassical) Metaphors for “The
Economy” 8 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Duke University Center for the History of
Political Economy).
35. Tobin, supra note 4, at 232.
36. Id. at 225. Typical introductory macroeconomics textbooks exhibit a similar logic. They discuss
the economy “in the long run,” free from monetary distortions; those are set aside for consideration of
“the short term” with attention to monetary dynamics. See, e.g., N. GREGORY MANKIW,
MACROECONOMICS (5th ed. 2003). But the economy in the long run is a moneyed economy: a unit of
account exists and is presumed even as the focus is on the real economy.
37. See, e.g., id. at 158; FREDERIC S. MISHKIN, THE ECONOMICS OF MONEY, BANKING, AND
FINANCIAL MARKETS 57–59 (9th ed. 2010); Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth:
Views and Agenda, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 688 (1997); Tobin, supra note 4, at 224–25; see also Neil
Wallace, Lawrence R. Klein Lecture 2000: Whither Monetary Economics?, 42 INT’L ECON. REV. 847
(2001) (locating the need for credit and monitoring in lack of double coincidence of wants).
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uniformly explain it as a means of reducing the static of barter. As Tobin
summarizes, “the reason for the universality of money . . . is that it facilitates
trade.”38 It dissolves the barriers that make barter so “awkward and inefficient.”39
The double coincidence of wants is an applied problem, not a theoretical one.
If people had the wherewithal, they would be able to find and make the trades
they wish. That is, they understand the relative values of everyone’s
possessions—they merely need to find the right partner at the right time with the
right quantity and quality of goods they desire. Trade is a matter of degree, if you
will; an image that invites commentators to posit that money emerges from
existing trade to facilitate subsequent trade.
Note that the sequence reverses the logic of the conceptual models. Those
models recognize that a unit of account must be postulated both before
comparison takes place and in order to allow comparison to take place. Exchange
takes place subsequent to those choices; it merely carries them out. By contrast,
applied explanations rely on exchange to generate a unit of account. Much of the
time that happens on the ground. People converge on a commodity unit by
migrating towards an item that can serve as a medium, thus the classics like Carl
Menger’s “most saleable commodity,”40 and Karl Marx’s approach to gold as the
“universal equivalent.”41 Some of the time, participants in an exchange
community simply accept a suitable item by convention, thus John Locke’s claim
that silver was, by acclaim, “the money of account, and measure of trade, all
through the world.”42
The problem of commensurability is different. It poses the challenge of
comparison: how is it possible to compare an orange to an advance of resources,
or a dog to military service? What about the relationship of any of those to the
possession of land or art, or to the obligation to support the public order? That
question, infinitely harder, is virtually nonexistent in the economic literature on
money.43 That neglect, in contrast to the intense focus on the issue of the double
coincidence of wants, occurs because Walras’s auction has done its work. It has
established the intuitive power of the market-as-a-huge-bazaar, an orgy of real
exchange among objects of comparable value.44 Once we imagine the operational
auction (or existing trade carried out in money), we recognize friction or
38. Tobin, supra note 4, at 224.
39. Id.
40. CARL MENGER, ON THE ORIGINS OF MONEY 263 § 2 (1892).
41. KARL MARX, CAPITAL: A CRITIQUE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 162 (Ben Fowkes trans., 1976).
42. Further Considerations, supra note 3, at 422 § 2; see also R. A. Radford, The Economic
Organisation of a P.O.W. Camp, 12 ECONOMICA 190 (1945) (“[C]igarettes rose from the status of a
normal commodity to that of currency.”); Tobin, supra note 4, at 225 (“General agreement to the
convention, not the particular media agreed upon, is the source of money’s immense value to society.”).
43. One could argue that the question of commensurability haunts the economic literature insofar
as that work grapples with the issue of how to understand subjective value or utility. But those efforts do
not articulate the problem as the reason for money’s existence.
44. Existing markets in the real world, markets made with money, have the same effect. Indeed,
those markets—characterized by trade enabled by money—are surely the inspiration for Walras’s
auction.
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obstruction as plausibly providing a reason for money. That reason obscures the
conceptually prior possibility that money is necessary to create commensurability.
Setting the challenge of commensurability aside, we have a problem that is
manageable within the terms of neoclassical thought. Decentralized activity can
resolve frictions if items are comparable. In particular, that decentralized activity
can produce an object—a commodity or a convention of measure—that
facilitates the market if there is enough decentralized activity (that is, enough of
a market) in the first place. (Never mind the circularity; assuming
commensurability allows a significant amount of trade to occur without money.)
Finally, the “convergence” story about money’s creation tacitly reinforces the
discipline’s normative stake in the market’s democratic character. Most
evidently, a wide range of participants have vetted the medium and chosen to
accept it; apparently, they could opt out if they preferred. As a medium, money
is hypothetically available to all as a measuring tool, although not a factor
endowment. In that important sense, it is distributively neutral—even though we
will find it unevenly accumulated by individuals.
Of course, there are distortions that separate this applied world we have
constructed from the conceptual one. Thus the moneys hypothesized by
economists as emerging from barter or convention do not resemble the
numeraire. Either they carry value as money and therefore depart from the
definition of a commodity equivalent that Hahn and Tobin imputed to the
numeraire, or they have no intrinsic value and therefore provide no coherent
reference for measuring that quality. In the first category are all those items
selected as money because bartering agents prefer them increasingly until they
emerge as a medium. The very act of bartering for a commodity preferentially
because it will be used as a unit of account changes the value of the commodity.
That disqualifies it from acting as a sister commodity in the Walrasian model. In
the contemporary neoclassical literature, a set of models that posit moneys that
are “productive”—necessary to resolve cash-in-advance requirements or
transactional frictions—fail for this reason.45 As Neil Wallace argues, general
equilibrium theory assumes complete competitive markets; it is therefore
inconsistent with a money that is productive in its ability to aid transactions.46
Wallace in turn crafts a theory of money according to which an intrinsically
worthless object is circulated as evidence of past behavior. That is, one gives
money as a token to document a good or service provided; the money produces
information on the behavior of contracting parties as opposed to resolving
transactional frictions.47 Wallace acknowledges that his theory is inconsistent
with the assumption in general equilibrium theory that markets for credit are
45. Wallace, supra note 37, at 847–48.
46. Id. at 848–49.
47. Id.; see also Neil Wallace, The Mechanism-Design Approach to Monetary Theory, in 3A
HANDBOOK OF MONETARY ECONOMICS 4–5 (Benjamin M. Friedman & Michael Woodford eds., 2011)
(discussing the benefits of a mechanism design approach to monetary theory); MARTIN SHUBIK, 1 THE
THEORY OF MONEY AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 322 (1999) (arguing for an alternative approach to
the price system to reconcile micro and macroeconomics).
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perfect, but argues that the departure will be worthwhile given his theory’s ability
to account for money’s existence.48 But there is another problem he does not
recognize: his account does not explain how heterogeneous items become
commensurable. Narratives that propose an empty measure provide no reference
point against which comparison can proceed. Money, even if considered only as
a unit of account, is nothing like an inch or a pound. Those metrics are more like
denominations; they divide a matter already commensurable, like linear space or
weight. By contrast, money creates a reference point for an amorphous matter:
value. To this day, neither economists nor philosophers have agreed upon how to
conceptualize the “value” of time, goods, services, satisfactions, or desires. Once
that is done monetarily—the whole trick—no one really cares much how
denominations are ordained to subdivide existing value.
The moneys constructed by economists, aimed as they are to explain
problems of transactional frictions or informational shortfalls, therefore do not
satisfy the demand implied by the conceptual models for a unit that enables
commensurability. Somewhat ironically, that shortfall does not suggest the
inadequacy of those models for those advocating them. Recall that, given the role
that economists have identified for money as a medium—its operation to mitigate
the interference to the ideal market posed by real world conditions—the issue of
money is understood as a second-order problem. Economists can correct for
monetary dynamics while categorizing those dynamics as distortions given
money’s deviation in the real world from the abstract numeraire.
Those distortions may be grave. The fact that commodity moneys never
behaved like the commodity they contained bedeviled the European medieval
world. Gresham’s law, competitive debasements, and the bewildering traps of
bimetallism followed from the fact that money’s face value diverged from its
metallic value—and would always diverge, no matter if individuals knew the
metallic value down to the grain. The issues raised in the modern world are
arguably more profound. Keynes’s notion of liquidity preference turns on the
point that people value a medium for its “moneyness,” a utility it carries that
affects its value and people’s desire to hold it.49 That demand interferes with the
identity of savings with investment. Another problem occurs because cash, the
transactional medium, has long been supplemented, one might say submerged,
by a thick layer of financial assets offering different degrees of liquidity and
different returns for risk. That market also complicates the flow of savings into
investment, arguably obstructing it.50 Much of macroeconomics and monetary

48. Wallace, supra note 47, at 4–5.
49. John Hicks may have been the first to use the term “moneyness” in this sense. See JOHN HICKS,
VALUE AND CAPITAL: AN INQUIRY INTO SOME FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMIC THEORY
163 (1947).
50. Tobin, supra note 4, at 239–40.
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policy might be understood as dealing with the consequences, the distortions to
the ideal, that result.51
In short, neoclassical economics has produced a position on money dictated
by the discipline’s implicit theory of value. Mainstream approaches assume that
value pre-exists interaction. They prioritize the choice that individuals make
among valued goods as a critical act of self-determination and assume the process
of exchange as the execution of that choice. In order to make the comparative
process cognizable, they posit an abstract and neutral unit of account that
precedes and facilitates that activity. At the same time, neoclassical approaches
accommodate money in practice (that is, in the real world) as a medium
constructed by individuals who, already able to compare goods, face frictions in
the exchange. Those frictions are a second-order problem, one that makes trade
difficult but not impossible. In fact, in the applied realm, trade—the activity that
only executes choice in equilibrium analysis—produces money as a means of
facilitating more exchange. The role and salience of exchange confirms the
market as a decentralized phenomenon, consistent with the democratic vision of
free choice as the base of neoclassical commitments. The distortions that occur
in the real world will be managed by fixes that are also second-order.
III
MONEY AS A PUBLIC CREDIT MEDIUM
Money is not so easily tamed; again and again it violates the neoclassical
edifice constructed to house it. That is incontrovertibly true in the contemporary
world, where money does not resemble the numeraire; neither is it a commodity
nor a signifier empty of material value.52 Virtually all modern sovereign moneys
are credit mediums that entail material value, unit by unit. They are created by
governments or, as in the case of the European Union, consortia of governments.
Those authorities create an official unit of account, control issue of that unit, and
take it back for taxes and other public payments. (If a debtor does not have
money, a government will confiscate goods of an equal “monetary” value, thus
providing a material anchor for its currency.) Governments further support the
value of their sovereign moneys by privileging its travel between individuals:
officials enforce transactions for value made in the official monetary unit.
American courts, for example, default to the dollar as the medium that states and
51. See MICHEL BEAUD & GILLES DOSTALER, ECONOMIC THOUGHT SINCE KEYNES: A HISTORY
DICTIONARY OF MAJOR ECONOMISTS 29 (1997) (discussing the differences between economic
models that assume money supply is endogenous and models that assume it is exogenous).
52. Even coin, often assumed to circulate as a commodity, operated as a public credit money, if its
design in Britain is representative. The government there clearly authored money, determined that it
should operate at face value, committed to accepting it for public payment, and privileged its use in
individual exchange. Given that character, coin’s metal content acted as a kind of collateral—for both
users and the government, while the coin’s nominal value depended on the government’s credit. In fact,
one way to understand the argument over whether coin traveled at “extrinsic” (or face) value or the
“intrinsic” value of its metal content is that the debate concerns whether coin was a credit money or a
simple commodity. I canvas the evidence and argument in DESAN, supra note 5, at 70–107.
AND
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conveys the value necessary to settle contracts, to redress injuries in tort, to
convey property, and to comply with myriad other requirements from
jurisdictional thresholds to regulatory standards.53
Money issued by commercial banks—a profuse source of money since the
nineteenth century—fits within the architecture constructed for the dollar and
other sovereign moneys. Commercial banks issue credit denominated in the
official unit of account in the form of private promises-to-pay money to one
sovereign or another. Those representations of private credit—bank deposits—
are treated as money, not just credit: they hold immediate purchasing power. And
they hold that purchasing power because they are embedded in national
payments systems that allow banks to clear their obligations against each other,
borrow from each other, and depend on the central bank for help—all in the
official unit of account. In that way, public credit money systems add “elasticity”
to the monetary base. That is, they include an avenue for the money supply to
expand in response to the demand by individuals who want money for their own
purposes.54
The character of modern moneys suggests a solution to the conundrum about
commensurability that haunts the neoclassical approach. Communities do in fact
require a unit to render value commensurable before participants set about the
enterprise of comparing goods. The neoclassical theorists correctly insist on that
logic. But the monetary unit is neither an abstraction, nor a commodity that
costlessly distinguishes itself, nor an empty measure. Rather, communities
construct a unit of account by creating a token that carries value relevant to each
participant. They do that in the figure of credit that is good to satisfy political
dues or, in the case of bank-issued money, credit that is good to repay an
advance—thus the pattern of credit money that we find pervasive across the
modern world.
Once participants have a comparative unit, they use it in exchange. That
practice puts a money value—a price—on goods and other commodities. The
practice of exchange with a unit of comparative value therefore creates
commensurability and, by that token (literally), articulates value. In other words,
insofar as we consider money an expression of value, that value does not reflect

53. See generally Christine A. Desan, The Monetary Structure of Economic Activity (Harvard Pub.
Law Working Paper, 2020), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3557233
[https://perma.cc/YHP9-9B4T] (detailing the ways in which governments influence which assets are
considered valuable).
54. See generally Hockett & Omarova, supra note 6, at 1147 (arguing that the modern financial
system is a public-private partnership between financial institutions and sovereigns); Perry Mehrling,
Payment vs. Funding: The Law of Reflux for Today (Inst. for New Econ. Thinking, Working Paper No.
113, 2020) (illustrating payments elasticity through credit creation by private banks). Coined regimes
built in elasticity by drawing on the collateralized nature of their money. Sovereigns could expand the
money supply for private use (thus adding “elasticity”) by taking collateral as the content of coin that
they agreed to mint in return. For the way the “free minting” (or minting on demand) system worked,
see generally THOMAS J. SARGENT & FRANÇOIS R. VELDE, THE BIG PROBLEM OF SMALL CHANGE
(2002), which documents the evolution of monetary theory and minting technology over 600 years. See
also DESAN, supra note 5, at 70–71 (describing the free minting system in medieval England).
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pre-existing preferences.55 Rather, the value expressed in money follows the
practice of exchange in money and is a product of that exchange.
Finally, in that process, the character of money as credit matters. In particular,
credit money enters circulation selectively: it is an advance (a credit) made to
some people relative to others. Thus money, inherent to the way it is constructed
as credit, comes into use as a resource that some participants acquire first. That
character affects the practices made with money, including the establishment of
prices. At a formal level, money is allocatively partial; it cannot be a neutral
medium.
We can begin rethinking the process by which money is made and put into
circulation where neoclassical approaches do. Like the unit hypothesized there,
credit moneys can also be conceptualized at a theoretical level. The stakeholder
model is one such attempt.56 The model starts from the premise that groups are
as elemental as individuals in understanding exchange. Groups survive on the
basis of contributions from members. At times, however, groups facing
emergencies or sudden shortfalls want to mobilize help outside the usual
schedule of member contributions. In that case, a stakeholder for the community
can draft contributions from some members in advance and “pay” for that
advance by giving them IOUs. Each IOU confirms that the member has given a
contribution early: it denominates that contribution as a credit, inviting the
person holding the IOU to “redeem” it by turning in the IOU next time a member
contribution is due, instead of making a new and additional contribution. The
arrangement explains how a unit—written in the term of one contribution—
comes to entail value in a reliable way: The group has, collectively, a reference
point for value—the recurring contributions made to it and anticipated in the
future.57
A second step explains how money moves from an accounting device to a
medium. That transition, routinely assumed by economists, actually draws on the
issuing authority’s decision to accept a public credit unit back from anyone’s
hand, not only the individual initially paid. The accommodation greatly increases
money’s capacity: it now serves not only public uses (mobilizing contributions

55. Compare the Walrasian approach, which Orléan describes as identifying price as a matter
“discover[ed]” by a comparison of values. See ORLÉAN, supra note 1, at 46.
56. I have elaborated the stakeholder theory at length elsewhere; it captures the “constitutional”
aspect of money as an important dimension of governance. See DESAN, supra note 5, at 45–50; Christine
Desan, Decoding the Design of Money, EUR. FIN. REV., Feb.–Mar. 2015, at 24. There are similar and
contrasting models of credit-based money. See, e.g., Charles W. Calomiris, Institutional Failure, Monetary
Scarcity, and the Depreciation of the Continental, 48 J. ECON. HIST. 47 (1988); Farley Grubb, Chronic
Specie Scarcity and Efficient Barter: The Problem of Maintaining an Outside Money Supply in British
Colonial America, in INSIDE MONEY: RE-THEORIZING LIQUIDITY AS A MATTER OF DESIGN (Christine
Desan ed., forthcoming); Bruce D. Smith, American Colonial Monetary Regimes: The Failure of the
Quantity Theory and Some Evidence of an Alternate View, 18 CAN. J. ECON. 531 (1985); L. Randall Wray,
Alternative Approaches to Money, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 29 (2010).
57. For details, including the discounts that individuals may demand for advancing their labor and
the premium that money carries as a transferable token, see DESAN, supra note 5, at 45–50, 70–107. The
next paragraph is elaborated in the same sources.
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through spending in IOUs) but private ones as well (exchange between
individuals). In fact, individuals regularly want more money than the government
puts into circulation for its own use. Communities routinely find ways to expand
the credit money made by the public to service trade between individuals—thus
the commercial bank money of the modern world.58
Once communities have constructed a comparative unit that has relevance for
participants, they will use it in exchange. Sharing an entity that entails value has
novel importance in a community populated by people who, previously, had
incommensurable needs and resources. In fact, the new money is uniquely
appealing because people can use it to trade for objects they need or want.59
That trading activity is contiguous with the character of the money used:
participants have credit money, issued by governments and amplified by
commercial banks. We must look to the nature of credit money—including the
way it is introduced into a community of users—in order to understand the
practice of exchange and the values that result.
Understanding money as a public credit indicates that money enters
circulation selectively. That phenomenon appears constitutive to the rationale
and process of money creation. If so, the medium, with all its capacity for
generating growth and widespread benefits, also carries an inherent nonneutrality: the condition of allocative bias. The circumstances of making money
not only produce an instrument with unparalleled relevance as a comparative
unit, they also inject it unevenly into circulation. That condition will affect the
way the market prices value in that money.
To analyze the phenomenon, we need to unpack the reasons that a
government or a bank creates a unit of credit. Recall that, under our public credit
theory, a stakeholder would invent money by issuing credit, written in the term
of anticipated revenue, when it needed to draft contributions to the group in
advance of the time they were due. That innovation allows a stakeholder to hire
certain people and acquire specific goods. Wartime is the paradigmatic example;
not coincidentally, it is also a period when governments often create or redesign
their moneys.60 A government spends on the industries and people that it needs
for its defense. It then taxes back as it did originally, matching its selective
dispensation of resources by taking in obligations owed more broadly. (In effect,
the government is paying for the contributions it took in advance by sticking to
the system that gives its IOUs value.)
The strategy of issuing credit against future revenue is aimed, at bottom, at
creating the capacity to spend specifically. If the government could obtain the

58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
59. Credit can be figured in the unit as well. It will have to be settled in money, and therefore
remains tied to the issue and existence of the unit. N. J. Mayhew, Population, Money Supply, and the
Velocity of Circulation in England, 1300-1700, 48 ECON. HIST. REV. 238, 253–54 (1995).
60. Examples include early Anglo-Saxon innovation, the Bank of England, the assignats created
during the French Revolution, and the Federal Reserve insofar as its mission, defined in 1913, was
redefined by World War I a few years later.
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flexibility it wanted by spending evenly (that is, hiring evenly) across the
population, it could simply increase the routine contributions that everyone owes
the group. In fact, pre-monetary governments and groups may frequently do or
have done that—but those events would not be the instances in which they
innovated money. There would be no reason to give out credit tokens to mark
the advance of a contribution to the group: the whole population would have
given resources and each person is in the same boat relative to others. By
contrast, money as a credit represents a claim by an individual relative to the
contributions due the community from her peers. Money, by definition,
represents compensation to an individual for a disparate (advance) contribution.
That condition indicates that the way money enters circulation influences
production, distribution, and prices. Public spending for goods and services
effectively allocates to certain hands a transactional medium that offers unique
benefits—cash services—to individuals. We might imagine a government paying,
consistently over time, those people with the skills and strength to be soldiers.
That subset of society now holds an asset that others want; they will compete to
supply the soldiers’ needs in particular, driving down prices for the goods that
soldiers prefer. Those needing money will not make the same efforts to satisfy
others, even if those people have significant amounts of wealth in other forms.
Those forms do not carry the cash-quality that attaches to the credit medium.
These dynamics will affect production and output in complex ways. They might
increase the supply of goods demanded by the money monopolists at the expense
of other goods, for example, or incentivize sellers to differentiate between
segments of the market, lowering prices for the monopolists buying in bulk. In
any case, the differential access to liquidity inherent in the way credit money
enters circulation would affect relative prices and production in the market.
Demand for the government’s money would also affect the willingness of
people to sign up as soldiers or give other goods in advance. In negotiating for
labor, a government might have to discount its medium, accepting less labor for
full exoneration in the future or, conversely when demand for money by
individuals is high, receiving a full contribution in advance.61 When people sell
their services to the government for lower prices, those selling to the money
monopolists would assumedly need to lower their prices a corresponding amount.
But in that case as well, the prices that those without much money face for goods
would remain relatively higher.
The more consistently a government spends to one group, our soldiers for
example, the more privileged that group is compared to others in society. Those
others could of course adjust their skills and compete for the state’s business. But
that change would be particularly difficult, given that they lack money to facilitate
their retraining and relocating—transaction costs are built into the situation, as
those conceptualizing the pre-monetary world as barter would agree. The fact

61. For a mapping of this effect, see generally Desan, supra note 53.
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that private demand for money modifies the structure of production suggests
again that the way money enters circulation shapes economic exchange.
In short, as the actor creating the money stock, the government is a sui generis
party. Its approach to spending its money into circulation matters greatly. In
modern polities like the United States, the government is the single largest actor
in the economy—an economy written in its public credit medium, the dollar.
Today, the federal government’s spending comprises twenty-one percent of
GDP.62 Even aside from the way its balance of priorities affects health, education,
welfare, infrastructure, and defense on their own terms, its allocation of money
privileges certain beneficiaries with the allocation of a resource singular for its
liquidity. That is the resource these beneficiaries will use to bid for goods and
services in the market. The government’s authorship irrevocably affects, then, the
relative values made in the unit it produces.
But the allocative bias inherent in the character of money is more penetrating
yet. The government destroys money as well as creating it. Like all credit, money
has value until its moment of retirement. In the simple example here, where
money holds value against an anticipated tax or public payment, that event
cancels a unit of the medium.63 That corollary to spending reminds us that a
government’s tax system becomes part of the allocative drama.
Imagine that a community, like the one we assumed at the outset, levied a tax
on all its members (that is, they all shared an obligation to contribute regularly
to support it). Imagine also that the society converts to primarily using money. In
other words, instead of taking in-kind contributions from people, the government
generally spends to specific parties, and then takes taxes from the broader
population in money. In the United States today, federal taxation matches
spending in magnitude, if not precise quantity.64 In that case, money is no longer
an optional resource for people, one that they want for reasons of their own
exchange. Rather, individuals need the monetary resource to pay their public
dues. Their need for money as a mode of payment means that they must deal with
those who have that resource. They are tied into an economy in which people are
differentiated by their access to money and the bargaining power it represents.
62. THE WHITE HOUSE, BUDGET FOR A BETTER AMERICA (2019) https://www.whitehouse.gov/
wp-content/uploads/2019/03/budget-fy2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/7MG7-5MGA] [hereinafter BUDGET].
The U.S. government spends about twenty percent of its budget on the military. See Kimberly Amadeo,
US Military Budgets, Its Components, Challenges, and Growth, BALANCE (Dec. 7, 2019), https://www.t
hebalance.com/u-s-military-budget-components-challenges-growth-3306320
[https://perma.cc/5SGHD2RJ] (identifying expected military spending for fiscal year 2021 at $934 billion); Kimberly Amadeo,
US Federal Budget Breakdown, BALANCE (Mar. 3, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/u-s-federalbudget-breakdown-3305789 [https://perma.cc/36JF-ZUV4] [hereinafter US Federal Budget Breakdown]
(identifying $4.829 trillion in projected total federal spending in fiscal year 2021). It spends another sixty
percent on entitlements. US Federal Budget Breakdown, supra.
63. The American colonies ran economies based on classic tax anticipation currencies. See, e.g.,
Calomiris, supra note 56.
64. Federal taxation is about 16.5% relative to GDP; government debt makes up the difference
between federal spending and taxing. Kimberly Amadeo, US Federal Government Tax Revenue,
BALANCE (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.thebalance.com/current-u-s-federal-government-tax-revenue3305762 [https://perma.cc/T782-KG75].
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The modern architecture of money creation adds another twist to the drama.
Most modern governments do not create money by spending it directly into
circulation.65 Governments today tax in already-existing money (money created
in an earlier round of government action) and spend those funds. They also
borrow previously issued money now in private hands. By contrast, governments
increase the money supply—or create new money—when their central banks
purchase public debt, the very debt that governments issue when they borrow.66
Central banks purchase that public debt (or other qualified assets) by issuing
credit—new public credit money or fiat money—for it. In the modern world,
then, money creation is conducted through a circuitous route, one mediated by
central banks and public debt (and other assets).67
The circuitous route taken in the modern world also matters. Politically, the
system came about by happenstance, improvisation, and some shrewd
calculation: the strategy created an alliance between government and investors.
The design offered an asset to those with money to lend the government; as an
investment, a government bond was relatively safe, especially as governments
learned to monetize those bonds when they needed to. At the same time, the
design offered governments good lenders and political allies. Relatedly, the
arrangement established a device that reinforced the government’s commitment
to tax in a disciplined way; there was now a group of creditors with a particular
interest in that practice. No doubt the design also increased the credibility of the
government by yoking investors into a set of supporting obligations, originally
including the responsibility of redeeming their own notes in coin.68
But independent from (or implicit in) those important innovations is that the
modern architecture channels money creation through finance—the central
bank’s purchase of either public debt or other qualified investment assets. The
system, by its very design, sorts members of the public who hold enough money
to invest in financial instruments from those who do not. A flow of funds to the
former is built into the way modern governments add to the money supply.
Today, the government’s debt channels an amount equivalent to ten percent of
65. They always retain the ability to do so, however, and regularly recur to it. Civil War greenbacks,
Treasury notes, and early American paper money are moneys made by that method. Coin is somewhat
similar: insofar as governments require payment in coin and make mints available to convert bullion into
coin, they effectively draft people to supply a currency made of metal that the government then collects
and spends.
66. Central banks can also purchase other qualified assets, increasing the money supply by that
route as well.
67. See Morgan Ricks, Money as Infrastructure, 3 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 757, 772–87 (2018)
(detailing modern monetary policy in the United States); Christine Desan, Money Creation by the
Federal Reserve: A Note on the Basics of Legal Authority (2019) (draft on file with author) (detailing
the role of the Federal Reserve in the creation of money). Randall Wray argues that, in addition,
government deficit spending effectively increases the money supply. See L. Randall Wray, Outside
Money: The Advantages of Owning the Magic Porridge Pot, in INSIDE MONEY, supra note 56.
68. Initially, national banks were privately owned. A group of investors agreed to lend to a
government, taking its national debt and issuing their private promises-to-pay. The government then
spent and taxed in those promises, assimilating them to its own money. The dollar is, thus, a “Federal
Reserve Note.” See generally DESAN, supra note 5, at 295–329.
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GDP to investors.69 The construction is a striking aspect, arguably definitional, of
modern capitalism.70
The conclusion that money enters circulation selectively holds when we add
commercial banks to the analysis. Those institutions expand the money supply by
issuing deposits against private borrowing, the longer-term loans they make to
customers. Banks extend that credit by making promises-to-pay the official unit
of account, with the permission of the issuing sovereign and the support of its
payments system.71 Those commercial entities thus hold a significant monopoly
in the contemporary system as agents of money creation.72
Banks claim that role according to a particular theory: they are supposed to
be experts in allocating credit. Commercial lenders are entrepreneurs out to
make a profit from lending money. Motivated by their own interest in getting
repaid by borrowers, they use local knowledge and experience to find those
people and projects most likely to generate a material return in the length of the
loan period. They make loans only to those prospects.73
The banks’ strategy maximizes the chance that the credit they extend will be
returned to them with interest. By the same token, the strategy virtually
advertises that banks will selectively dispense access to money, as represented by
their extension of private credit. Projects that promise a profit to bankers
become, literally, the occasion for money creation through the issue of deposits.
By contrast, projects that cannot promise a profit will not be similarly blessed—
even if they contribute to the social good in non-material ways, are productive in
nonmonetary ways, are simply slow to mature in terms of monetary profit, or fail
to motivate bankers to lend for an arbitrary reason. In other words, commercial
banks create money in accord with their priorities; their distributive rationale
affects the way private credit money issues and to whom. They also affect, thus,
the way prices are set.
There are, in other words, no “helicopter drops” of money as in the textbook
hypotheticals. Rather, the rationale for creating a monetary unit, whether the
money was made by a sovereign government or the deposit issued by a bank, is
to spend it selectively. The patterns by which money enters circulation bless
69. BUDGET, supra note 62, at 109; see also US Federal Budget Breakdown, supra note 62.
70. For the impact on wealth and its distribution, see, for example, SANDY BRIAN HAGER, PUBLIC
DEBT, INEQUALITY, AND POWER: THE MAKING OF A MODERN DEBT STATE (2016). For a definition
of capitalism based on this and related changes in money’s design, see DESAN, supra note 5, at 5–6.
71. For the relevant law in the United States, see, for example, Thompson v. Riggs, 72 U.S. 663
(1866).
72. More recently, other financial entities have found ways to construct and issue what some
scholars call “near-moneys,” repo agreements, and similar instruments that they use to fund investments
in the capital markets. See generally GARY GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF
2007 (2010). Those “shadow banks” also depend on the sovereign unit of account, drawing credit from
conventional banks, clearing in the sovereign unit and, as of the Financial Crisis, relying on the Federal
Reserve (and other central banks) for support.
73. See, e.g., ALEXANDER HAMILTON, FIRST REPORT ON THE PUBLIC CREDIT (1790),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Hamilton/01-06-02-0076-0002-0001
[https://perma.cc/MY26U5S5]; Amar Bhidé, Why We Need Traditional Banking, NAT’L AFF., Winter 2018, at 78.
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people differentially with access to the resource of liquidity. Exchange takes
place in those circumstances.
In short, recognizing why societies make money and how they do it recasts
the way we approach the market and the values we observe there. First, societies
create a unit of account because their members (including public officials) need
a way to compare values that are otherwise not commensurable. Making money
out of credit works to that end: it produces a unit of substantive value that is
relevant to all or most individuals because each person can use it to satisfy their
political dues or, in the case of bank money, to repay their loans. That innovation
allows exchange to take place: using the unit, people will make deals for money.
That process generates prices.
In that process, the character of money as credit matters: by its very structure,
money only enters circulation as it is allocated by governments and banks to
particular parties. That selectivity affects the exchange that follows. It means that,
according to the way money is created—definitionally we might say—individuals
will not be equally situated in the process that generates prices. Decisions about
value are made in the wake of that fact.
IV
CONCLUSION: INCOMMENSURABLE APPROACHES
Considering money as a public credit generates a profoundly different
approach to value than that in neoclassical formulations. For many in that
tradition, the market is conceptualized as a forum or process in which individuals
express pre-existing preferences according to a self-evident measure. By contrast,
the public credit approach suggests that groups build a touchstone for value by
configuring their relations—thus the credit unit they create out of political
obligation.74 That unit allows comparison and exchange, activities that produce
the market and the prices observed there.
Just as neoclassical formulations have normative implications, so also does
the credit approach. Most conspicuously, the credit approach recasts the image
of democracy and its possibility. Recall that the neoclassical tradition offers a
vision of democracy that turns fundamentally around maximizing choice, the
freedom to name value and claim it. Agents bid independently, insulated from
undue influence, ideally in the auction setting. In that vision, public activity is a
neutral coordinating device—the auctioneer and its abstract numeraire.
By contrast, understanding money as a public credit medium locates
collective action as foundational to market regimes. Governance is catalytic in
creating commensurable value for a particular community. That governance is a
relational matter—it recognizes groups as composed of contributing members.
Moreover, it creates its touchstone for value, the unit of account, by reorganizing
their relations when it accepts resources early from some and advances them
74. For a focus on this process as a way to package political obligation in a circulating unit, see
generally Desan, supra note 53.
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credit relative to others. Democracy becomes a matter that starts with mutual
contribution but requires even more. It entails a complex system in which a group
sustains itself by structuring its growth and character through a process of
soliciting and managing resources, distributing benefits, and spreading costs—all
difficult matters that require discussion and deliberation.
That project is expansive. It includes making public credit—money—for
public needs and goals, as well as private exchange. On the first, we can
understand the tight fit between modernization and money, between political
capacity and robust fiscal states, and between monetary innovation and
mobilization for war, welfare, economic development, or other reasons.75 The
connection between money and society suggests that money is an infrastructural
resource and collective good.76 Recognizing money as a public credit medium
thus frames political activity as a significant component of money’s genealogy
and purpose.
As for private exchange, we should understand the way modern communities
structure credit and its allocation as critical decisions about the market society
they are creating. The determination to identify commercial banks as the conduit
for money creation shapes what kind of projects and industries find funds and
prosper. More generally, the financial system as a whole is an elaborately
engineered dimension of governance in modern polities. Its dynamics, an
operation carried out in official units of account and structured by permissions
and defaults of public authority, determine the flow of material wealth, privilege,
and voice.
At an elemental level, recognizing money as public credit installs a particular
challenge at the heart of democratic governance in a monetary world. Rather
than suggesting the priority of protecting individual autonomy, it poses as
fundamental the difficulty of ensuring equality. Making money is an
emancipatory innovation for communities because it allows them to create
commensurability in value. But that project, by its very unfolding, orders people
in disparate ways and begets differential access to money itself. Far from
assuming that markets operate equally, the challenge is to make markets that
engender equality.

75. See, e.g., JOHN BREWER, THE SINEWS OF POWER: WAR MONEY AND THE ENGLISH STATE,
1688-1783 (1988); Isaac William Martin et al., The Thunder of History: The Origins and Development of
the New Fiscal Sociology, in THE NEW FISCAL SOCIOLOGY: TAXATION IN COMPARATIVE AND
HISTORICAL DIMENSION (Isaac William Martin et al. eds., 2009); Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM
MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY (H. H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1958).
76. See, e.g., MEHRSA BARADARAN, HOW THE OTHER HALF BANKS: EXCLUSION,
EXPLOITATION, AND THE THREAT TO DEMOCRACY (2015); Ricks, supra note 67.

